The Limits of Hard Power

Not as much deep history on this one; just some comments on what has seemed to grab the most headlines from outlets like Axios and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). I respect both, especially the latter, as gathering and analyzing important data close to the front lines, whether in the current Israel-Iran conflict, or previously and up to the present in Ukraine. And yet, a certain opacity seems to persist when it comes to getting behind the front lines, which I think is important in the present case.

Over roughly the past 48 hours, Israel has visited on the Islamic Republic of Iran more or less the same treatment that it meted out in Operation Focus some 58 years ago, and again last year — much more relevant to Iran, as well as more current — to Hezbollah (1, 2). Even accepting some Iranian successes in hitting Israeli targets, the one-two punch of Israeli intelligence and air assets is a remarkably hard thing to counter. It's probably fair to guess at this time that Israel retains active operatives on the ground, and near if not total air supremacy.

The major hard power item remaining on the agenda is bunker-busting the Fordow uranium enrichment site — something beyond easy reach for Israeli capabilities. Supposing that Israel does find a way to punch through the side of a mountain, though…

Go back to 1967. Again despite local successes, Arab forces and governments were generally shamed for their poor performance during the Six Day War. Egypt lost Sinai, and within a few years, its union with Syria. Jordan hasn't fought a foreign enemy since that war, and Black September 1970 decisively ended any sense of close cooperation with Palestinian liberation initiatives. But for all of this, Egypt did remain committed to the anti-Israeli cause in the War of Attrition, and Syria regrouped and re-armed for another foray — what we now know in the Israeli-informed West as the Yom Kippur War.

Look at the Islamic Republic. Well might Israeli forces have decapitated the Republican Guard and Iranian military command and control, especially for air and anti-air assets, but are we looking at an Iranian revolution brewing? Not if hard power is all that's in play.

So back to ISW and Axios. Good on their front line reporting. Good on what typically grabs headlines day-by-day, not least with conventional assets as professional, active, and sophisticated as those maintained by Israel. All the better with more from Radio Farda, and the leading edge of Israel's apparent soft power initiatives, all the way up to Netanyahu's direct appeal to the people of Iran.

A follow-up question bears asking here, as well: it seems there should be no question of Israeli opposition to Iran's current government developing nuclear weapons. Would opinion be any different if a restored, pro-Israeli Shah pursued the same program?