A French Center?

Geopolitics in Western Europe has been dominated by the United States since World War II. That happened for a variety of reasons, many of which are now well out of date. If and as the American presence in Europe recedes, who might step in?

The French, of course! But not just for reasons of capability and prestige in the present day. (1, 2)

Going back to World War II, one might dispute how well Americans were prepared for the hostile seas, skies, and beaches that awaited them, but there is much less question about U.S. supply, logistics, force projection, and financial and infrastructure roles in shaping the late war and postwar order all around the world. Proud societies understandably felt themselves eclipsed by American largesse, and it's reasonable to see the Gaullisme of mid-century France (wikipedia summary here) as partly a reaction to Western Europe's traditional premier land power being completely overshadowed by Germany and Britain in quick succession, and soon enough, the newcomer Americans.

Fast forward to 2025, and the perseverance of France as one of the leading regional powers — and the only nuclear power on the continent of Western Europe — leads fairly rationally to suggestions that France, today, should take a leading role in NATO's ongoing progress into Eastern Europe and beyond.

Rewind to 1725, however, and it's possible to see some fairly deep historical grounding for the role that France is now set to take — perhaps a fair counterpoint to Russia's withdrawal from the European concert. It's around this time that premodern French involvement in Eastern Europe reached its height, amid some curious, potentially informative historical footnotes.

Three hundred years ago, the leading ministers in France took a distinctly weighty decision in the marriage match for their 15-year-old king, Louis XV. Betrothed to the five-year-old Infanta Mariana Victoria of Spain, the young king appeared set to reinforce his great-grandfather's policy of dynastic if not personal union between the governments of France and Spain; but it was not to be. A sudden illness jolted the ministers to seek a more mature bride in the shorter term, and to invalidate the betrothal at great short-term cost to Franco-Spanish relations.

Among ninety-nine possible brides according to one account at the time, the ministers settled on a choice not terribly controversial in France, but intriguing in its foregn policy implications for what had been, and what was to come. Marie Leszczyńska was the daughter of Stanisław Leszczyński, formerly the Swedish-allied (one might say Swedish-imposed) King of Poland during the Great Northern War. Did the French ministers just announce to Europe that they had ambitions in Poland? Not necessarily; but it was also harder to deny that they had a political pawn in hand, ready to play in Eastern Europe.

John L Sutton's book on the War of the Polish Succession (1980) makes it pretty clear that some fragment of French foreign policy really was committed to a particular view of Polish politics and security by the early 1730s — and perhaps not just returning Louis' father-in-law to the throne — to the point that a small contingent of French troops actually engaged an invading Russian army, and the French ministry actively pondered whether and at what scale to send a fleet into the Baltic Sea.

There is of course a lot more to say on the French foreign policy, and European geopolitics in general, during the Utrecht period, or as some have called it, the Stately Quadrille (ca. 1713-48); but the lesson for the present is that France, under the guiding hand of Cardinal André Hércule de Fleury, really did conceive and pursue security interests in Eastern Europe even a couple of generations before Napoleon, with boots on the ground, and absent some fiery protests from across the Channel, ships very likely ready to go to sea.

Why recall Louis XV's marriage and the War of the Polish Succession in the present day? Surely international politics have changed beyond all recognition…

We're not looking at a dynastic struggle in 2025, but it is worth noting of Cardinal Fleury's period of primacy (roughly 1725 -1741), that France was among the first powers in Western Europe to note the danger of Russian aggression in the east, and to try to do something about it. If Russian aggression in 2022-25 represents a kind of turning away from the European concert, then it may well be for this historical reason, as well as modern geopolitics, that France is the best state on the spot to work with strategic partners holding the line.